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Abstract
This document is a response to a report from the University of Melbourne on the privacy of
the Opal dataset release. The Opal dataset was released by Data61 (CSIRO) in conjunction with
the Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW). The data consists of two separate weeks of “tap-
on/tap-off” data of individuals who used any of the four different modes of public transport from
TfNSW: buses, light rail, train and ferries. These taps are recorded through the smart ticketing
system, known as Opal, available in the state of New South Wales, Australia.
1 Introduction
This document is in relation to a report from Culnane, Rubinstein and Teaque [1] assessing the privacy
of the Opal dataset release from Data61 (CSIRO) in conjunction with the Transport for New South
Wales (TfNSW) [2, 3]. Briefly, the Opal dataset is a set of trips from commuters using different
public transport modes available in the state of New South Wales (NSW), Australia. These trips
were recorded through the smart ticketing system, known as Opal, available in NSW. A sample of
this data was sanitized via a differentially private treatment by Data61 [3] and TfNSW made the
resulting datasets available for download as open data [2]. Details about the Opal dataset and its
privacy preserving release can be found in [2, 3]. The purpose of this document is to address some
points raised by Culnane et al. in [1] regarding the privacy of the release. We shall refer to this as
the CRT report. It should be noted that our technical report [3] was not available to Culnane et al.
2 Response
In what follows, we addressed some of the points raised in the CRT report. We recommend the reader
to read our technical report [3] before reading this response.
Aggregation of Stops, Routes and Times
It is hinted in the CRT report that the aggregation of some stops (tap-on or off locations) and routes
(trips) is done to protect privacy. In actual, as discussed in [3, §4.1], the stops and times were
aggregated and binned, respectively, to ensure that the dataset is sufficiently dense.1 This in turn
ensures that sufficiently many points are returned by the SBH algorithm.2 For instance, the number
of stops for buses were far too many to result in a dense dataset. Likewise the original times, that
were within a one minute interval, would have resulted in a sparse dataset, resulting in not many
1See Definition 7 in [3, §2] for what we mean by dense versus sparse datasets.
2The SBH (Stability-based Histogram) algorithm appears in [4, §7.1], [5] which slightly modifies the online version
of the algorithm proposed in [6]. The algorithm is reproduced in [3, §3].
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points released in the output through the SBH algorithm. Thus, aggregation of stops and times was
done to make the domain narrower and hence the datasets more dense. This was done from a utility
perspective, and not for privacy. Privacy follows automatically from the differential privacy of the
process.
Decoupling of Tap-on and Tap-off Events
The decoupling of these events was done once again to make the two separate datasets more dense,
and hence to enable the algorithm to output more points. Thus, this was done not to protect privacy
as is indicated in the CRT report, but to improve utility. Indeed, one could use the algorithm with
both the tap-on/tap-off events, i.e., each row containing tap-on and off times and locations. The only
problem would be that the resulting dataset would be more sparse, and hence many points from the
original dataset would be removed in the synthetic output. The issue would not be privacy but the
utility of the resulting dataset.
Detection of Individuals or Groups
The CRT report states that the algorithm used to release the Opal dataset is at best (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private with a small but constant δ, as opposed to δ being negligible in the size of the dataset. As
mentioned in [3, §4], the released Opal dataset is indeed (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. For δ, it is true
that in theory it is supposed to be negligible in the size of the dataset. More precisely, it should be
smaller than any inverse polynomial power of n, where n is the size of the dataset D [4, 7]. However,
in practice, we need to instantiate δ with some value. Once we instantiate δ, by definition it is a
constant, and no longer equivalent to its theoretical definition. Therefore, we need to ensure that δ
is a small enough constant so that the event associated with δ is unlikely to occur in practice. By
looking at the SBH algorithm, we see that we need to set δ such that the probability of the event
that a trip that is only performed by a single individual, i.e., the bad event defined in the proof of
Theorem 5 [3, §3.2], is small. This probability is given by δj/2, where j denotes one of the six column-
wise partitions. We fixed δj = 1/8000000 ≈ 2
−23, making this probability approximately 2−24. The
value of δj ≈ 2
−23 implies that the overall value of δ (by basic composition) is less than 2−20 or 10−6.
This value of δ has been used before in the literature [8, §6], and is slightly far from another value
of 2−30 recommended in [9, §8, p. 11]. Note that together with ǫ = 2, this meant that the threshold
of the SBH algorithm for the two-column datasets was 18. This number protects the aforementioned
bad event for individuals as well as small groups (of say, size 5) with high probability. A much smaller
value of δj and subsequently δ could be chosen. However, smaller values result in a higher threshold in
the SBH algorithm, producing less points (trips) in the output. This was a compromise made between
utility and privacy.
Pure versus Approximate Differential Privacy
The CRT report states that pure differential privacy should be preferred over approximate differential
privacy since the latter is a weaker notion of privacy. There are varying opinions around the merits
of approximate differential privacy as opposed to pure differential privacy. Pure differential privacy is
indeed a stronger notion of privacy, where as approximate differential privacy is a slight relaxation.
The relaxation allows to sometimes develop more efficient algorithms with more accurate answers
to specific queries than what is allowed by pure differential privacy [4, 7]. Approximate differential
privacy essentially means that the output is pure differentially private except for a small probability
characterised by δ. This probability should be small enough for such an event to be improbable, hence
a value of δ negligible in the size of the dataset is recommended. This is similar to an analogous practice
in cryptography, where the success probability of an adversary attempting to break the cryptosystem
is required to be negligible in the size of the security parameter. Thus, while pure differential privacy
is preferable, in the absence of efficient and high utility algorithms, we do not believe there is any
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harm in using approximate differential privacy as long as it is understood what privacy implications
may occur if the value of δ is not chosen appropriately.
Use of the Algorithm on Sensitive Data
It is mentioned in the CRT report that our approach should not be used on more sensitive datasets
for privacy reasons. However, as long as the notion of approximate differential privacy is considered
an acceptable definition of privacy, there is no distinction between sensitive or non-sensitive data.
Indeed the algorithm by definition ensures that sensitive data points are almost always never output
(provided appropriate ǫ and δ are chosen)! Sensitive data by nature will make each row unique and
will result in the input dataset being sparse.3 It is the construction of the SBH algorithm that unique
points are not released (with overwhelming probability, based on the value of δ). The algorithm
protects privacy regardless of the nature of the data, as long as an appropriate value of δ is chosen.
Thus, there is nothing inherently wrong with our approach. The only risk is that of poor utility in
the released dataset, if it predominantly consists of sensitive (highly unique) points.
Differential Privacy versus Perfect Privacy
The CRT report states that there is a difference between perfect privacy and differential privacy, and
the two are not the same. This is true in principle, but can be misleading in making the reader
believe that there are some privacy vulnerabilities surrounding differential privacy. Perfect privacy
can be defined as the posterior and prior knowledge of an adversary remaining the same after it has
observed the output of an algorithm over some dataset. Within the differential privacy framework,
by choosing an ǫ = 0, it is possible to ensure that the probability of observing the same output from
two neighbouring datasets is exactly the same, thus achieving perfect privacy. This means, however,
that we gain nothing useful from the dataset [10, §4.1, p. 78]. What we observe from the dataset
could easily have been observed with some random output generated by simply ignoring the input
dataset. Differential privacy protects privacy of individuals while enabling statistical insights about
the population comprising the dataset. This is done by making the outputs indistinguishable between
neighbouring datasets (or indistinguishable with high probability in case of approximate differential
privacy). From the privacy point of view, this notion relates to the privacy of individuals as opposed
to all individuals within the dataset taken together. Insights on populations is what we seek to learn
from the dataset.
Public Disclosure of Differentially Private Algorithms and Privacy Parameters
Here we agree with the conclusion of the CRT report that any algorithm purported to provide dif-
ferential privacy should be disclosed together with a proof of privacy and the parameters used to
generate data. It is also illuminating to see how the values of the privacy parameters are inferred in
the CRT report from the released dataset. Notice that these parameters are not required to be kept
private according to the definition of differential privacy. The full description of the process used to
produce the Opal dataset as well as the parameters used can be found in [3]. However, it should also
be noted that our engagement was also of a commercial nature and commercial concerns can impact
what can and cannot be published.
To Perturb or Not to Perturb Zeroes
The CRT report recommends the use of an alternate algorithm that would also perturb points that
have a value of 0 in the input dataset. That is, even those points that are absent from the input
3There might be some confusion in exactly what is meant by sensitive data. Consider a dataset that contains your
full name. This by nature “sounds” like sensitive data. But if many other people in the dataset share the same full
name as you, the data is no longer sensitive. The data is sensitive only if it is rare or unique to you. In other words, if
it is only learnable through your data being in the dataset (or through the data of a small group being in the dataset).
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dataset but are otherwise points within the data domain. From the Opal dataset point of view, this
means even adding noise to trips that are absent in the input dataset. There are a couple of issues
with this approach which we highlight below.
Developing differentially private algorithms to produce synthetic datasets is in general a difficult
task. This is somewhat evident from the definition of differential privacy. Recall that in order for
an algorithm to be differentially private we need to consider all possible datasets D ∈ Xn and their
neighbours. If an algorithm uses as input all possible points in X , depending on how big X is,
it may become computationally infeasible. For instance, a straightforward mechanism to output the
histogram of some datasetD, i.e., answering all point functions, is to apply Laplace noise of magnitude
1/ǫ to the answers ax(D) to each point x ∈ X (even points that are not present in D). However,
in general X can be too large for this to be a practical solution. Consider a domain X having 4
attributes, each with range of magnitude 1000. Then the size of the domain, i.e., |X | is 1012. Thus,
the above algorithm will take time approximately proportional to 240 to release a synthetic dataset.
This means that adding noise to all 0 counts will result in an algorithm that is infeasible with a large
domain size.
Another issue with this approach is that the algorithm will then output points, i.e., trips, that have
no meaning in the real world. For instance, from the Opal dataset point of view, it might output a
trip whose route does not exist. Of course, in a post-processing step, these anomalies can be ruled out,
but doing so in general is not easy, as one needs to check each row for consistency. In the absence of
rules to check for consistency in an automated way, this becomes a prohibitive task. Such anomalous
trips could indeed be left as is in the output dataset. But this poses a problem from a usability
point of view. An analyst has no idea (without reference to a detailed route and time-table) whether
a given trip is indeed a valid trip or a by product of the synthetic data generation process. The
problem is exacerbated by noting that due to the nature of transport there could be delays in services
resulting in the dataset showing trips far off from their expected schedule in the time table. Similarly,
issues such as cancellation of services or other external factors may be significant. Nevertheless, the
above mentioned algorithm could be used if a dictionary of all possible trips (tap locations and time
combinations) is provided, and such a list is not too large from a computational point of view. Due
to time constraints, this approach was ruled out for the Opal data release but could be considered for
any future releases.
Creating Different Synthetic Datasets from the Same Dataset
The CRT report states that constructing different datasets from the same input datasets can have
unexpected consequences. This alludes to the 6 different synthetic datasets produced from the same
input dataset. It is further recommended that this be done by first producing a differentially private
version of the original dataset (taking all tap locations and times together) and then constructing
individual datasets from the result. We chose not to apply the SBH algorithm on the complete trip as
it made the original dataset too sparse, and hence the output would omit many points; an undesirable
outcome from a utility point of view. Thus, we decided to split the data and apply the algorithm
separately on each part. However, we do not agree that obtaining several datasets from the same
input dataset has unexpected consequences. The consequences are those that can be expected from
the privacy parameters of the overall release. We have done this by showing that the overall output is
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Thus, each of the datasets from the same original dataset may be (ǫj , δj)-
differentially private, with a smaller ǫj (and δj), the privacy guarantee is only in terms of the overall
ǫ and δ. Thus, the consequences are those that could result when this higher ǫ is taken into account
(and hence not unexpected).
The CRT report gives a few examples of how releasing several synthetic datasets from the same
original dataset can result in guessing the frequency of trips that were omitted due to a frequency less
than the threshold in the SBH algorithm. But this is not unexpected and can be explained through
the help of a simpler example. Suppose a dataset has only one column named ‘Gender.’ Further
suppose the dataset contains n = 110 rows, 100 of them male and 10 of them female. Suppose now
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we use the SBH algorithm with parameters ǫ = 1 and δ = 2−24. This means that the threshold of
the SBH algorithm is approximately 35. We now run the SBH algorithm twice: first on the counts
of males and females, and secondly on the total count n = 110.4 With overwhelming probability, the
output will have the number of males around 100, say 101, the number of females 0, and the total
count as approximately 110, say 109. From this, we can deduce that the total number of females
in the dataset was around 8; close to the value 10 which the algorithm tried to suppress. Does this
constitute a privacy violation? No. Recall the reason behind the threshold check. Intuitively, the
algorithm is trying to hide points that do not exist in the original dataset behind points that have a
low count, thus making the two indistinguishable. In this example, there are no other points in the
domain (the domain is simply male or female gender). Thus, the algorithm might as well have output
the (noisy) number of females, without any privacy violation. This will be (ǫ, 0)-differentially private.5
The examples given in the CRT report highlight precisely these cases. For instance, the example of
the ferry trips given in Section 4.1 of the CRT report indicates that the Cremorne Point wharf was
the only possible trip within that time period. The algorithm could have simply output the noisy
count of people at that point without any privacy violation. But by construction, the algorithm does
not do so.
Thus, deriving several datasets from the same original dataset does not constitute a privacy viola-
tion as long as it is ensured that the collection is altogether (ǫ, δ)-private with a precisely quantified
(bounded) ǫ and δ via the composition theorem. As this is indeed the case with the different synthetic
datasets of the Opal data, this does not constitute a privacy breach. This should also be clear from
online mechanisms used in differential privacy, which allow multiple queries on the same dataset, even
repeat queries, which is acknowledged in the CRT report.
Ruling out Datasets with Non-Zero Counts for Trips
The CRT report states that not perturbing the zero counts is an error, which could be used to rule out
certain datasets from the set of possible input datasets (given to the SBH algorithm). However, note
that the definition of differential privacy is around providing privacy for individuals, not for entire
datasets. By choosing ǫ and δ, it can be ensured that the threshold is set to a level which hides the
zero counts behind other low counts, thus providing protection for trips. Differential privacy does not
apply to protection of privacy for entire datasets. The definition considers all possible datasets and its
neighbours; not all possible datasets and all its distant neighbours. Such a definition (which again, is
not differential privacy) will provide limited utility and may hide insights into statistical trends from
datasets.
Correlated Rows
Some recent works have pointed out a supposed flaw in the definition of differential privacy namely
that it has an assumption around the rows of a dataset being independent [11, 12]. The CRT report
also mentions this and states that when the assumption fails to hold, then it reduces the privacy
guarantees (less than what a given value of ǫ suggests). However, this critique of differential privacy
is incorrect. By looking at the definition of differential privacy we see that no assumption on the
independence or dependence of rows is made. The definition only seeks to define privacy as the
indistinguishably in the output after exclusion of the individual from the dataset. If many individuals
happen to have correlated data, then it is precisely what the analyst seeks to learn from the data: the
general trend [10]. An oft-repeated example in the differential privacy literature is that of “smoking
causes cancer.” A dataset containing a list of smokers and a column indicating presence/absence of
cancer is expected to have many correlated rows. Differential privacy does not guarantee that removal
4The total privacy budget is therefore ǫ = 2, by basic composition.
5Notice also that since we access the dataset twice, first for number of males and females and then for n, the
mechanism is (2ǫ, 2δ)-differentially private. Therefore, the resulting threshold would also be lower (around 18) if we
had only chosen to answer the number of males and females with this higher privacy budget. The resulting threshold
is still higher than the number of females.
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of an individual from the dataset will hide the correlation between smoking and cancer. Once the
correlation is learned, then knowing that the target individual smokes reveals sensitive information
about the individual (high chance of cancer). If the population-wise correlations are to be hidden,
then there is nothing useful that can be learned from the data, which defeats the purpose of releasing
the data in the first place. See further discussion on this distinction in [10, §1.1.4].6
Having said that, the notion of privacy used by us is that of trip privacy. That is, each row of
the dataset D represents a single trip from some individual. That is, in the definition of differential
privacy two neighbouring datasets differ in one trip. An individual may have multiple trips in the
dataset. Thus, in this sense we ensure that the addition or removal of a single trip of an individual
does not change the output of the differentially private algorithm beyond what is allowed by the
privacy parameter ǫ. This is akin to providing edge privacy as opposed to node privacy in the context
of graph data [13, §1]; the latter being a stronger notion of privacy. We in fact first partition the
Opal dataset according to date and transport modes, so that for each transport mode and date pair,
we obtain a separate partition. This then amounts to providing privacy of a trip of an individual on
a particular date and transport mode. Since any identifying information has already been removed
in the output datasets, and since the datasets have been decoupled into different datasets based on
transport modes and dates, there is no obvious link between the trips. Therefore, we believe that
the somewhat weaker notion of trip privacy, as opposed to all trips from an individual, is reasonable
in this case. Using the stronger notion of privacy means that addition/removal of an individual may
effect multiple rows of the dataset (say trips made on the same day and same transport mode, or trips
made on different days with different transport modes). It is then not easy to obtain a tight upper
bound on the sensitivity that would result in reasonable perturbation through the Laplace mechanism
from a utility point-of-view.
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